OpenClaw security.exposure.open_groups_with_control_plane_tools: What It Means and How to Fix It

Published 2026-10-22 · Updated 2026-10-22 · By The Is My Agent Safe team

Short answer

security.exposure.open_groups_with_control_plane_tools is a finding from openclaw security audit. OpenClaw's docs rate it critical. Follow the fix steps below, then run openclaw security audit --deep again and check that the finding no longer appears.

This page covers one finding from OpenClaw's own security audit: what it means, how to fix it, and what to check afterward. It's based on OpenClaw's docs and source, linked at the end.

Paste your audit: run openclaw security audit --deep and paste the output into our free check for a red/amber/green result with the most important finding first (Limits of the check).

How to fix it

  1. Read the finding's detail. It lists each open policy path, then each agent context with its tool profile and the control-plane tools it can use.
  2. This stops your agent. It stays offline until you start it again a few steps below. Stop the Gateway with openclaw gateway stop before you change anything. Make a backup with openclaw backup create, and a quick copy of your config file so you can undo the change (openclaw config file shows where it is).
  3. Close each open path in the detail. For DMs, set dmPolicy to pairing or allowlist. For groups, set groupPolicy to allowlist or disabled. With allowlist, only the senders or groups you list can trigger the agent, and an empty group allowlist blocks group messages. openclaw security audit --fix switches common open group policies to allowlist, but it doesn't change DM policies or turn off tools.
  4. If a channel has to stay open, add automations, gateway and plugins to tools.deny. Setting the list replaces it, so check what's already there with openclaw config get tools.deny and keep those entries. Denying gateway also stops update requests from chat. You can still update from the Control UI.
  5. Start the Gateway again and run the audit. If you think someone in an open chat already changed plugins, scheduled jobs or your OpenClaw version, these steps aren't enough: follow OpenClaw's full incident-response plan (linked in the sources below).
openclaw gateway stop
openclaw backup create
cp ~/.openclaw/openclaw.json ~/.openclaw/openclaw.json.bak  # use the path from openclaw config file if it's different
openclaw config get tools.deny
# close each open path from the detail, for example:
openclaw config set channels.slack.dmPolicy pairing
# or, if the channel has to stay open (add any entries you already deny):
openclaw config set tools.deny '["automations","gateway","plugins"]' --strict-json
openclaw config validate
openclaw gateway start
openclaw security audit --deep

After any change, run openclaw config validate. If you stopped the Gateway, start it with openclaw gateway start. Then run openclaw security audit --deep and check that the finding is gone.

OpenClaw's docs say openclaw security audit --fix doesn't fix this finding, so the steps above are manual.

What this finding means

OpenClaw's audit raises this, always as critical, when a channel has a DM or group policy set to open and an agent can use any of the three control-plane tools: automations (scheduled jobs, also called cron), gateway and plugins. The finding's own text says prompt injection in open conversations "can trigger OpenClaw updates, plugin changes, or scheduled automation". OpenClaw's minimal, coding and messaging tool profiles all include gateway (limited to updates), so switching profile alone doesn't clear it. You need to close the open policies or deny the tools by name.

checkIdRating in OpenClaw's docsWhat OpenClaw's docs say it flags
security.exposure.open_groups_with_control_plane_toolscriticalOpen DMs/groups can reach update, automation, or plugin management tools

What it looks like in the audit output

Made-up example, not from a real agent:

CRITICAL security.exposure.open_groups_with_control_plane_tools
Open group/DM policy with control-plane tools exposed
Found inbound policy="open" at:
- channels.slack.dmPolicy
Control-plane tool exposure contexts:
- agents.defaults (profile=full; controlPlane=[automations, gateway, plugins])
Prompt injection in open conversations can trigger OpenClaw updates, plugin changes, or scheduled automation.

False alarms and open reports

What our free check covers

The free check at /check is paste-only. We check the text you paste: your openclaw security audit output. The check never connects to your agent or tests anything live. Nothing is installed into the agent you're checking. Green means no issues found in the checks we ran. The free check puts the most important finding first, in plain English, with how to fix that one when we have steps for it. The full report explains every finding and lists the fixes in order. The check doesn't detect malicious skills. We don't review the code inside skills or MCP servers ourselves, beyond what OpenClaw's own audit reports. The check is free, and a full report is $29. See Limits of the check.

Next steps

Sources

  1. OpenClaw docs: security audit checks (checkId catalog)
  2. OpenClaw docs: openclaw backup
  3. OpenClaw docs: openclaw config (config file)
  4. OpenClaw 2026.10.5 source: src/security/audit-extra.sync.ts (where the check is defined)
  5. OpenClaw docs: tool policy (profiles, tool groups, tools.deny)
  6. OpenClaw docs: hardened baseline
  7. OpenClaw docs: groups (groupPolicy)
  8. OpenClaw docs: pairing (dmPolicy)
  9. OpenClaw docs: Gateway service commands (start, stop)
  10. OpenClaw GitHub issue #175215: exposure checks ignore exact channel-to-agent bindings (open)
  11. OpenClaw docs: operator incident response (full plan)