OpenClaw gateway.http.no_auth: What It Means and How to Fix It

Published 2026-10-22 · Updated 2026-10-22 · By The Is My Agent Safe team

Short answer

gateway.http.no_auth is a finding from openclaw security audit. OpenClaw's docs rate it warn/critical. Follow the fix steps below, then run openclaw security audit --deep again and check that the finding no longer appears.

This page covers one finding from OpenClaw's own security audit: what it means, how to fix it, and what to check afterward. It's based on OpenClaw's docs and source, linked at the end.

Paste your audit: run openclaw security audit --deep and paste the output into our free check for a red/amber/green result with the most important finding first (Limits of the check).

How to fix it

  1. Check your auth mode and which optional endpoints are on with openclaw config get gateway.auth and openclaw config get gateway.http.endpoints.
  2. This stops your agent. It stays offline until you start it again a few steps below. Stop the Gateway with openclaw gateway stop before you change anything. Make a backup with openclaw backup create, and a quick copy of your config file so you can undo the change (openclaw config file shows where it is).
  3. Set gateway.auth.mode to token and generate a token with openclaw doctor --generate-gateway-token. This is OpenClaw's recommended fix.
  4. If you keep mode none on purpose (OpenClaw's docs say to use it only for trusted local loopback setups), keep gateway.bind at loopback and turn off the optional endpoints and plugins you don't use. /tools/invoke is always on, so the finding stays at warn.
  5. Start the Gateway and give HTTP clients the new token as a bearer token. If the Gateway was reachable beyond loopback without auth, follow the full rollback plan in OpenClaw's exposure runbook, and OpenClaw's full incident-response plan if you think someone used it.
openclaw config get gateway.auth
openclaw config get gateway.http.endpoints
openclaw gateway stop
openclaw backup create
cp ~/.openclaw/openclaw.json ~/.openclaw/openclaw.json.bak  # use the path from openclaw config file if it's different
openclaw config set gateway.auth.mode token
openclaw doctor --generate-gateway-token
# only if you keep mode none instead of the two token lines above; skip any endpoint your clients still use:
openclaw config set gateway.http.endpoints.chatCompletions.enabled false
openclaw config set gateway.http.endpoints.responses.enabled false
openclaw config validate
openclaw gateway start
openclaw security audit --deep

After any change, run openclaw config validate. If you stopped the Gateway, start it with openclaw gateway start. Then run openclaw security audit --deep and check that the finding is gone.

OpenClaw's docs say openclaw security audit --fix doesn't fix this finding, so the steps above are manual.

What this finding means

OpenClaw's audit raises this when the Gateway has no usable shared secret for its HTTP APIs: the auth mode is none, or token or password mode has an empty value. Trusted-proxy auth counts as auth. The detail lists the endpoints anyone who can reach the Gateway could call without a secret: /tools/invoke is always on, plus /v1/chat/completions and /v1/responses if you turned them on, and /api/v1/admin/rpc if the admin HTTP RPC plugin is enabled. OpenClaw's docs say to treat these endpoints as full operator access to the Gateway, so a caller could run tools and use your model accounts. It's critical when the Gateway binds beyond loopback or uses Tailscale Serve or Funnel, and warn on a loopback-only Gateway.

checkIdRating in OpenClaw's docsWhat OpenClaw's docs say it flags
gateway.http.no_authwarn/criticalGateway HTTP APIs reachable with auth.mode="none"
gateway.http.session_key_override_enabledinfoHTTP API callers can override sessionKey

What it looks like in the audit output

Made-up example, not from a real agent:

WARN gateway.http.no_auth
Gateway HTTP APIs are reachable without auth
gateway.auth.mode="none" leaves /tools/invoke, /v1/chat/completions callable without a shared secret. Treat this as trusted-local only and avoid exposing the gateway beyond loopback.
Fix: Set gateway.auth.mode to token/password (recommended). If you intentionally keep mode=none, keep gateway.bind=loopback and disable optional HTTP endpoints/plugins.

False alarms and open reports

What our free check covers

The free check at /check is paste-only. We check the text you paste: your openclaw security audit output. The check never connects to your agent or tests anything live. Nothing is installed into the agent you're checking. Green means no issues found in the checks we ran. The free check puts the most important finding first, in plain English, with how to fix that one when we have steps for it. The full report explains every finding and lists the fixes in order. The check doesn't detect malicious skills. We don't review the code inside skills or MCP servers ourselves, beyond what OpenClaw's own audit reports. The check is free, and a full report is $29. See Limits of the check.

Next steps

Sources

  1. OpenClaw docs: security audit checks (checkId catalog)
  2. OpenClaw docs: openclaw backup
  3. OpenClaw docs: openclaw config (config file)
  4. OpenClaw 2026.10.5 source: src/security/audit-extra.sync.ts (where the check is defined)
  5. OpenClaw docs: /tools/invoke HTTP API
  6. OpenClaw docs: OpenAI-compatible HTTP API (/v1/chat/completions)
  7. OpenClaw docs: network exposure (Gateway auth, reverse proxies)
  8. OpenClaw docs: Gateway configuration (auth modes, trustedProxies, allowRealIpFallback)
  9. OpenClaw docs: config hot reload (auth mode changes need a restart)
  10. OpenClaw docs: Gateway service commands (start, stop)
  11. OpenClaw GitHub issue #87815: status --deep showed gateway.http.no_auth with a secret-reference token (closed)
  12. OpenClaw docs: exposure runbook (full rollback plan)
  13. OpenClaw docs: operator incident response (full plan)