OpenClaw fs.config.perms_world_readable and Related Config Permission Findings
Published 2026-10-20 · Updated 2026-10-20 · By The Is My Agent Safe team
Short answer
Other users on the machine can read (or change) your OpenClaw config file, which can hold tokens and private settings. Fix it first: set the config file to 600 and the ~/.openclaw folder to 700, either by hand or with openclaw security audit --fix, then run openclaw security audit --deep again. If others could read it, rotate the tokens in it.
- OpenClaw rates perms_world_readable and perms_writable critical, and perms_group_readable warn. The same three exist for config include files as fs.config_include.*.
- Quickest fix: chmod 600 on the file that openclaw config file prints, and chmod 700 on ~/.openclaw. openclaw security audit --fix does the same, plus a few other changes.
- If others could read the file, rotate the tokens and keys in it. Changing permissions doesn't undo a read.
- Four Windows reports of fs.config.perms_writable firing wrongly because of how the SYSTEM account was named are all closed on GitHub.
Paste your audit: run openclaw security audit --deep and paste the output into our free check for a red/amber/green result with the most important finding first (Limits of the check).
What should I do first?
On macOS or Linux, tighten the permissions by hand:
openclaw config file # prints the config path chmod 600 "$(openclaw config file)" chmod 700 ~/.openclaw # or your state folder, if you've moved it openclaw security audit --deep
OpenClaw's secrets and storage docs list the intended permissions: openclaw.json at 600 ("user read/write only") and ~/.openclaw at 700 ("user only"). The config file command prints the active path, including one set with OPENCLAW_CONFIG_PATH. If the finding names a different path, such as an include file, use that.
Or let OpenClaw do it. The openclaw security audit --fix docs say it tightens permissions for state, config, config include files and common sensitive files, using chmod on POSIX hosts and icacls resets on Windows. It also changes common groupPolicy="open" settings to allowlist, so read that page before you run it.
When the audit comes back without the finding, you're done with the permissions.
If other users could read the file, rotate what's in it. Changing permissions doesn't undo a read. Rotate the Gateway token or password and any provider keys stored in the config. OpenClaw's operator incident response plan covers this in full: containing access, rotating Gateway and provider credentials, reviewing logs, transcripts and recent config changes, and re-running the audit.
What do these findings mean?
OpenClaw's security audit checks page lists the family:
| checkId | Severity | OpenClaw's description |
|---|---|---|
fs.config.perms_world_readable | critical | "Config can expose tokens/settings" |
fs.config.perms_group_readable | warn | "Group users can read config tokens/settings" |
fs.config.perms_writable | critical | "Others can change auth/tool policy/config" |
fs.config.symlink | warn | "Symlinked config files are unsupported for writes and add another trust boundary" |
fs.config_include.perms_world_readable | critical | "Included secrets/settings are world-readable" |
fs.config_include.perms_group_readable | warn | "Group users can read included secrets/settings" |
fs.config_include.perms_writable | critical | "Config include file can be modified by others" |
In OpenClaw 2026.10.5's source, each file gets at most one permission finding, in this order: writable, then world-readable, then group-readable. If the config file is a symlink, the audit reports fs.config.symlink and skips the two readable checks. Include files work the same way, without the symlink check (see audit-extra.async.ts).
The detail starts with the path and its permissions, then ends with fixed text:
- world- or group-readable config: "config can contain tokens and private settings."
- writable config: "another user could change gateway/auth/tool policies."
- readable include file: "include files can contain tokens and private settings."
- writable include file: "another user could influence your effective config."
If the config is a symlink
fs.config.symlink is a warn. OpenClaw's checks table says to "replace with a regular config file or point OPENCLAW_CONFIG_PATH at the real file". Because a symlink skips the readable checks, also check the permissions of the real file yourself.
Could it be a false alarm?
First, see the actual permissions:
ls -l "$(openclaw config file)" ls -ld ~/.openclaw
If the file shows read access for group or others (for example -rw-r--r--), the finding matches the file.
On Windows, four GitHub reports said fs.config.perms_writable fired wrongly because the audit didn't recognize the Windows SYSTEM account: #16150 (garbled name), #22573 (an ACL with only SYSTEM and the owner), and #29681 and #35834 (localized Windows, such as French). All four were filed and closed as completed between February and March 2026. If you still see the finding on 2026.10.5 on Windows, run icacls on the config file and check every account listed. If the only accounts listed are you and SYSTEM, that matches what the closed reports described, so it may be a new false alarm. Report it on GitHub with the icacls output, after removing your username if you prefer.
Our guide to audit false alarms covers how to check a finding and report it. Don't suppress a critical finding you haven't confirmed.
What our free check covers
The free check at /check is paste-only. We check the text you paste: your openclaw security audit output. The check never connects to your Gateway or reads files on your machine, so it can't see the permissions themselves. Nothing is installed into the agent you're checking. Green means no issues found in the checks we ran.
The free check puts the most important finding first, in plain English. The full report explains every finding and lists the fixes in order. The check doesn't detect malicious skills. We don't review the code inside skills or MCP servers ourselves, beyond what OpenClaw's own audit reports. The check is free, and a full report is $29. See Limits of the check.
Frequently asked questions
What does fs.config.perms_world_readable mean?
Every user on the machine can read your OpenClaw config file. The audit detail ends: "config can contain tokens and private settings." OpenClaw rates it critical.
How do I fix fs.config.perms_world_readable?
Run chmod 600 "$(openclaw config file)" and chmod 700 ~/.openclaw, or run openclaw security audit --fix. Then re-run openclaw security audit --deep. If other users could read the file, rotate the tokens and keys in it.
What's the difference between world_readable, group_readable and writable?
world_readable (critical) means anyone on the machine can read the file. group_readable (warn) means members of the file's group can. perms_writable (critical) means other users or the group can change it. OpenClaw reports only the most serious of the three for each file.
Is fs.config.perms_writable a false alarm on Windows?
It was in four reports from February and March 2026, where the audit misread the Windows SYSTEM account. All four are closed on GitHub. If you still see it on 2026.10.5, run icacls on the file and check every account it lists before you report it.
What if someone may have read my config?
Follow OpenClaw's operator incident response plan in full. It covers containing access, rotating Gateway and provider credentials, reviewing logs, transcripts and config changes, and re-running the audit.
Can your free check see my file permissions?
No. We check the text you paste, which is where this finding comes from. The check never connects to your Gateway or reads files on your machine.
Sources
- OpenClaw docs: security audit checks (checkId catalog)
- OpenClaw docs: openclaw security (what --fix changes)
- OpenClaw docs: secrets and storage (file permissions)
- OpenClaw docs: openclaw config (config file)
- OpenClaw docs: operator incident response
- OpenClaw source v2026.10.5: src/security/audit.ts (config file checks)
- OpenClaw source v2026.10.5: src/security/audit-extra.async.ts (include file checks)
- GitHub issue #16150 (closed): Windows SYSTEM name and perms_writable
- GitHub issue #22573 (closed): Windows perms_writable with SYSTEM and owner only
- GitHub issue #29681 (closed): perms_writable on French Windows
- GitHub issue #35834 (closed): localized Windows SYSTEM shown as others writable
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